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Conclusion
Given prior Oklahoma decisions, it is questionable that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court would rely on only two Oklahoma cases, while dismissing
all others, to arrive at the conclusion that there is no covenant for further
exploration. The virtue of the separate covenant appears to greatly outweigh
its faults. The lessee will not suffer any out-of-pocket loss by cancellation
of his lease. The only duty involved is to drill or to surrender the nonproducing
portion of the lease. There is also a strong policy against holding a lease solely
for speculation purposes and in favor of developing all natural resources. Op-
ponents of the covenant say that it may become a lease-breaking device and
that it will force the lessee to become a wildcatter. These arguments are not
persuasive because courts will not allow lease cancellation unless there is an
unreasonable delay that is unjustified.
It is obvious that in circumstances where the lease covers a large area com-
pared to the area that is being developed and there is either an unreasonable
delay in exploring further, or a refusal to drill at all, the courts have allowed
cancellation as to these unexplored portions of the lease without compelling
the lessor to prove probable profitability of the additional wells. This is, in
effect, judicial recognition of the implied covenant for further exploration
without the standard of the prudent operator rule being applied. It appears
that Mitchell was decided incorrectly in light of previous case law.
Vicki J. Vaniman
Public Utilities: Reducing the Burden of Nuclear Power
Plant Abandonment
In the traditional scheme of utilities regulation, a state public utilities com-
mission (PUC) is empowered to limit the rates charged by electrical utilities
to their customers. The rate prescribed must be fair and reasonable to both
the ratepayers and the utility.' Such limitations are a necessary adjunct to
the protection of ratepayers because public utilities are normally franchised
by the state and maintain a monopoly on the utilities market within the fran-
chise area. The lack of extrinsically imposed restraints on the utility rate-making
process could be disastrous for the ratepayers.
On the other hand, a public utility is entitled to a fair return on the value
of its property used or useful in the public service. Rates that are insufficient
to yield a fair return are unjust to the utility company and unreasonable.
Enforcement of unreasonable rates by a PUC amounts to confiscation of
private property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution.2
1. Am. JuR. 2d Public Utilities § 135 (1972).
2. American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 307 U.S. 486 (1939). The Court in this
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The proper regulation of utility rates becomes increasingly difficult when
utilities attempt to incorporate sophisticated nuclear technology into their
generating facilities. The past decade has revealed an increasing number of
environmental and economic problems attendant o the use of nuclear power
as a domestic energy source. In addition, the economic and regulatory obstacles
to the use of nuclear power have increased dramatically in the wake of the
1979 loss-of-coolant accident at Three Mile Island. Oklahoma's Black Fox
generating plant was one of the casualties of the subsequent industry-wide
reevaluation of the value of nuclear power.
This note will focus on the major economic factors that have escalated the
costs of nuclear generating plants and how these costs are absorbed when
such plants are abandoned. Because such costs are ultimately borne by
ratepayers, the note will also survey statutory schemes that limit expenditures
for generating plants that are likely to be poor investments. These schemes
are especially important in the regulation of nuclear power generation because
even the costs of preconstruction licensing and feasibility studies can impose
a staggering burden on ratepayers.
The Ratepayer's Burden
Construction Work in Progress
Rate-setting *by a PUC requires the establishment of a rate base that fixes
the value of property devoted by the utility to the public service. An ap-
propriate rate of return is allowed to the utility for items included in the rate
base. Normally, a utility is not entitled to incorporate in its rate base any
property not currently used or useful, no matter how useful it may have been
in the past or how useful it might be in the future.3
In some states, however, the cost of nonuseful property may be incorporated
in the utility's rate base if the state PUC finds that the investment is prudent.4
One way of passing these costs to the ratepayers is the inclusion of construction
work in progress (CWIP) in the rate base. Including CWIP in the rate base
allows utilities to charge customers for the current construction costs of power
plants. Customers pay more, over a longer period of time, for electricity that
will be produced when the plant is completed much later. While this allows
the utility to reduce its current borrowing and may save a great deal of money
case said the utility must prove the permitted rates are too low to yield a reasonable return.
Id. at 494-95.
3. Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938). See also Penn-
sylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., UTi. L. RP. (State) (CCH) 23,117
(May 23, 1980), in which the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission found that Unit 1 of
the Three Mile Island power station was not used or useful and could not be included in the
utility's rate base. Although Unit I was functional, the Commission found that substantial uncer-
tainty existed with respect to the resumption of electrical generation at Unit I because of ongoing
investigations into the utility's competence. The Commission said Unit 1 would be reincorporated
into the rate base when it resumed generation.
4. Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,
288 (1923).
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over the life of a nuclear power plant, it requires customers to pay increases
of up to 15% for services they do not currently receive;' this violates the
basic premise that ratepayers should pay only for facilities used and useful.
If current construction costs are not included in the rate base, the utility
must issue new bonds or debentures to cover the short-term borrowing needed
for construction costs. Ratepayers are then forced to pay higher rates in order
to guarantee a reasonable rate of return to the utility shareholders.
Abandoned and Canceled Plants
Ratepayers are further burdened when a nuclear project is canceled or aban-
doned. If a state PUC allows a utility to amortize the losses attributable to
an abandoned project, the costs are passed directly to ratepayers over a
specified term of years. The unamortized balance may be included in the rate
base or absorbed by the utility shareholders. Ratepayers are again forced to
pay higher rates to cover the amortization or to ensure a reasonable rate of
return to the shareholders.
Oklahomans served by Public Service Company are intimately acquainted
with economic repercussions of the abandonment of nuclear power plants.
When the construction of its Black Fox nuclear plant was delayed by the re-
vision of safety standards by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, PSO ap-
plied to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for a rate increase. In this
application, PSO sought to include in its rate base $132.3 million of CWIP
attributable to Black Fox. Ten different parties intervened in the rate-making
proceedings, saying Black Fox was an imprudent investment that should not
be completed and protesting the inclusion of CWIP in PSO's rate base. In
response, the Corporation Commission agreed to expand the scope of the
proceedings to investigate the incorporation of Black Fox construction costs.6
After months of study by the Corporation Commission staff and detailed
economic analysis of Black Fox by Touche Ross & Co., the Commission con-
cluded that Black Fox was no longer feasible, and that CWIP would not be
included in the rate base should PSO pursue the construction of Black Fox
as a nuclear facility. The Commission said it would include CWIP to the ex-
tent that the existing construction at Black Fox could be converted for the
use of coal-fired generation. The Commission then recognized that PSO would
be forced into bankruptcy if its shareholders were forced to absorb the loss
and permitted a straight-line amortization of such loss over a ten-year period.7
Many other states are facing the question of whether to include the costs
of abandoned or canceled nuclear projects in utility rate structures. Since the
loss-of-coolant accident at Three Mile Island in March 1979, nuclear power
projects have been subjected to extraordinary scrutiny and delays, with atten-
dant cost increases. Many utility companies have reconsidered proposed nuclear
5. HousE Comm. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, NucL.EAR POWER COSTS, H.R. REP. No. 1090,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR POWER COSTS].
6. Order No. 197837 of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Sept. 4, 1981.
7. Order No. 206560 of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Jan. 15, 1982.
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projects and found that the costs of minimizing nuclear safety hazards far
outweigh any anticipated benefits; these utilities have canceled proposed nuclear
projects and abandoned those already under construction. Other utilities have
canceled nuclear power projects when state PUCs refused to approve the pro-
jects, or when the plant's generating capacity would exceed demand.8
8. The following twelve examples reflect the conservative attitude assumed by many utilities
in the wake of Three Mile Island:
(1) Northeast Utilities abandoned its proposed nuclear generating station at Montague Plains,
Mass., after determining the plant would not be required to meet demands for electricity during
the time frame for which it was planned. Northeast Utilities plans to apply to the Massachusetts
PUC for recovery of $29 million in costs directly associated with the nuclear project. Montague
Nuclear Project Is Canceled, PuB. Uma. FORT., Jan. 29, 1981, at 43.
(2) Louisiana Power & Light Company canceled its St. Rosalie nuclear generator project
after investing $13.6 million. An administrative judge for the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) allowed the utility to amortize these costs over a five-year period, but excluded
the unamortized balance from the rate base, saying the burden of the carrying charges would
be lessened by quick recovery and the costs of electrical service would be credited with the benefit
of tax deductions taken on the loss. Massela, Recouping Abandoned Construction Losses, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Feb. 26, 1981, at 60 [hereinafter cited as Massela].
(3) Virginia Electric & Power Company abandoned its Surry Nuclear Project, and a FERC
administrative judge permitted amortization of the loss over a ten-year period. The unamortized
balance was not included in the rate base. This treatment was approved by PUCs in Virginia
and North Carolina. Massela, supra, at 62.
(4) Southern California Edison abandoned its Huntington Beach and Vidal nuclear plants.
The California PUC allowed the utility to amortize the losses associated with the Huntington
Beach plant, but refused to incorporate the Vidal losses because the utility had not proven the
prudence of the write-off. Massela, supra, at 61.
(5) Northern States Power Company sustained a $103.3 million loss when it canceled its
Tyrone Energy Park nuclear project after the Wisconsin PUC refused to issue a certificate of
need for the plant. A FERC administrative judge determined that $75 million in costs were to
be borne by the co-owner utilities and allowed amortization over a variable period, targeted
at ten years. Massela, supra, at 62. North Dakota's PUC decided that ratepayers should not
be directly charged with any of the cancellation costs attributable to the North Dakota utility's
participation in the Tyrone project. Annual Report, 1981 A.B.A. SEc. PUB. Uru.rrY L. REP. 107.
(6) Arizona Public Service Company canceled its Palo Verde nuclear plant and sought to
incorporate the loss in its rate structure. The Arizona Corporation Commission excluded all of
the costs for four reasons: first, Public Service failed to prove the prudence of its investment
in Palo Verde; second, the expense was unusual and nonrecurring; third, shareholders should
bear the loss since construction planning is a management function; and fourth, it was inap-
propriate to burden Arizona ratepayers with expenses triggered by conditions in California, which
made the continuing participation of California utilities in the project uncertain. Massela, supra,
at 62.
(7) San Diego Gas & Electric Company sustained a $90 million loss when it suspended
work on its Sundesert nuclear plant. The California PUC divided this loss into site-related and
nonsite-related costs. The site-related costs were included in the rate base because the utility reserved
the site for future use. The nonsite-related costs were given a five-year amortization period without
rate base treatment. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., PUB. Urm. RaP. (PUR) 4th 435 (1979).
(8) The Carolina Power & Light Company incurred a loss of $7 million when it canceled
its South River nuclear plant because of diminished demand forecasts. North Carolina's PUC
allowed both a five-year amortization and rate base treatment of the unamortized balance. This
decision passed the entire cost directly to ratepayers. Massela, supra, at 63.
(9) Wisconsin Electric & Power Company canceled its Haver nuclear plant and requested
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/35
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Allocation of costs between shareholders and ratepayers affects only the
time at which ratepayers are burdened. The most effective ways to protect
ratepayers from unnecessary rate increases are to reduce the costs of con-
structing nuclear plants and to prevent utilities from investing in nuclear pro-
jects that will never produce any electricity.
Construction Costs
Capital Outlays
Capital costs for nuclear power plants have risen three times as fast as the
rate of inflation and one and one-half times as fast as the costs of coal-fired
generators.9 These costs rose 142% between 1971 and 1978,10 and cost escala-
tions will probably intensify as a result of the Three Mile Island accident."
Much of the increased cost of nuclear plant construction is attributable to
design changes needed to comply with stricter statutory and regulatory
requirements.'" As each new requirement is imposed, the utility must stop
construction and revise its designs to conform to the new standards. If the
delays are imposed after design engineering commences, the additional costs
for the nuclear unit may exceed $100 million per year of delay.3
Although inflation accounts for part of the cost increases resulting from
construction delays, serious errors in cost estimates account for a great deal
rate base treatment of the plant costs. The Wisconsin PUC established alternative treatment of
the costs, based on future use of the plant site. If the utility renews its plans to build a generating
plant, the costs will be amortized over a three-year period without rate base treatment of the
balance. If the construction site is completely abandoned, however, the costs will be amortized
over a three-year period with rate base treatment of the balance. Massela, supra, at 63.
(10) Public Service Electric & Gas Company incurred a $319 million loss when it abandoned
its Atlantic Generating Station project, which was aimed at locating floating nuclear power plants
off the coast of New Jersey. The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities allowed a twenty-year
amorization without rate base treatment of only $174.5 million. Annual Report, 1981 A.B.A.
SEC. PUB. UTm. L. REP. 133.
(11) Wisconsin Public Service Corporation lost $1.2 million in precertification expenses
when the Koskonong Nuclear Plant was abandoned. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission
required the utility to write off the sum as an extraordinary property loss, although it found
the expenditures prudent. The Circuit Court of Brown County, Wis., reversed the ruling as in-
consistent with the Commission's finding and remanded for further consideration. Annual Report,
1981 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. UTIL. L. REP. 132.
(12) Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company sustained a $56.4 million loss when it ter-
minated four nuclear power plants. The Ohio PUC allowed the utility to amortize the entire
loss over a ten-year period. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the ruling because the invest-
ment never provided any service to the ratepayers. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981).
9. Nuclear Economics Part V71. Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 246,
247 (1979) (statement of Charles Komanoff) [hereinafter cited as Nuclear Economics Hearings].
10. Id. at 265.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Id. at 657-58 (statement of Leonard F.C. Reichle).
13. Id. at 63 (statement of William W. Brandfon).
[Vol. 36
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
NOTES
of the apparent cost increase. Cost overruns of 100% and more are common
in the construction of nuclear plants. The House Committee on Government
Operations has reported overruns ranging from 175% to 265 W."
Errors are inherent in the methods typically used by utilities to project costs.
The usual method is to specify plant design characteristics, estimate the amount
and cost of labor and materials needed to meet these specifications, then tally
the costs. This method is doomed to fail because of the impossibility of predict-
ing the safety standards that will be imposed that affect plant design
requirements.'I
Even periodic revision of cost estimates has failed to predict construction
costs accurately. During the licensing and construction of its Seabrook Station
nuclear plant, Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSCO) made the
following cost estimates: $1.2 billion original estimate in 1972; $1.6 billion
in 1974; $2.2 billion in 1976; and $2.6 billion in 1977.16
Dual Regulation
Some of the delays that contribute to increased construction costs are a
result of the lengthy procedure for acquiring a construction permit for a nuclear
facility. The licensing process is controlled by the federal government and
is designed to test every one of the proposed plant's safety features and en-
vironmental safeguards.
The federal -government originally retained exclusive authority over the
development and use of nuclear energy in order to control its use for weapons.
Later, however, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which
recognized the role of private business in the development of peaceful uses
for nuclear power.' In its 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, Con-
gress sought to define the respective roles of the states and the federal govern-
ment regarding nuclear power. These amendments included procedures whereby
the Atomic Energy Commission, the federal agency responsible for regulating
nuclear power, could share with the states its authority to regulate use of
fissionable materials.18
Section 271 of the Atomic Energy Act expressly preserves the right of states
to regulate the rates charged for electricity produced at a nuclear facility. 9
Another section preserves the states' right to participate in site selection for
purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.0 States' powers under
14. NucEAxR POWER CosTs, supra note 5, at 31. The report showed cost overruns of 267%
for the Boston Edison Company plant, 178% for the Omaha Power District Plant, and 175%
for the Vermont Yankee plant. Other statistics show overruns of 210% for the Florida Power
Company plant, id. at 41, and 194% for the Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant, id. at 99 (dissent).
15. Nuclear Economics Hearings, supra note 9, at 249 (statement of Charles Komanoff).
16. D. Smv rR, JR., SEABROOK AND THE NucLEAR REGULATORY CoMassIoN 113-14 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as SmvER].
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1980).
18. Id. § 2021.
19. Id. § 2018.
20. Id. § 2021(k), which reads: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority
of any state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards."
1983]
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this section to determine locations for nuclear reactors extend to matters such
as zoning and local interests. States may also exert control over some matters
that involve safety considerations in addition to radiation hazards, such as
location of active geological fault zones
I.2
This presumably leaves to the state the threshold decision of whether to
permit the development and construction of nuclear power plants within the
state. This premise is questionable, however, in light of the holding in Pacific
Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm'n,22 where plaintiffs challenged three sectiorns of the California Public
Resources Code23 that imposed restrictions upon the certification of nuclear
power plants. These statutes forbade the licensing of such plants until such
time as the State Energy Commission found that the authorized federal agency
had approved a technology for disposal of high-level nuclear wastes. Since
the Energy Commission found that the requisite findings on nuclear waste
disposal could not be made, these statutes effectively prevented the licensing
of any nuclear power plant in California.
24
The statutes challenged were purportedly enacted for the economic pur-
pose of ensuring that Californians would not have to bear the financial risk
of funding a nuclear power plant that may later be shut down because of
inadequate permanent waste disposal facilities.2 The court, however, found
that protection from radiation hazard was the true basis for the statutes, which
were impliedly preempted in favor of section 2021(c) of the Atomic Energy
Act.26
Even more disturbing than the finding of preemption under the particular
facts is the court's implication that any restrictions upon the licensing of nuclear
power plants would be void because they "stand as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes.and objectives of Congress." ' ,
Congress' policy to encourage the development and utilization of
nuclear energy would decidedly be frustrated if all fifty states had
statutes similar to California Public Resources Code § 25524.2.
21. Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
61 Cal. 2d 126, 300 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
22. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F.
Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
23. CAL. PUB. RF-s. CODE §§ 25524.1-25524.3 (West 1977).
24. 472 F. Supp. 191, 196 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
25. Id. at 198.
26. Id. at 199.. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976) reserves to the federal government the exclusive
authority to regulate "the disposal of such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear material
as the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission determines by regulation or order should, because of
the hazards .or potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed without a license from the
Commission."
27. 472 F. Supp. 191, 100 (S.D. Cal. 1974), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 42 (1941).
Accord, Northeastern States Power Co. v. State, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd 447
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af.fd per curiam, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Cf. New York Tel. Co. v.
New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979); Marinello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853 (3d
Cir. 1975).
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Although the Atomic Energy Act certainly leaves room for the state
to regulate on the subject of nuclear energy within the confines
of §§ 2021(k) and 2021(b), the power to regulate is not necessarily
the power to prohibit. There seems little point in enacting an Atomic
Energy Act and establishing a federal agency to promulgate ex-
tensive and pervasive regulations on the subject of construction
and operation of nuclear reactors and the disposal of nuclear waste
if it is within the prerogative of the states to outlaw the use of
atomic energy within their borders.
28
If the court is correct in assuming that states have no authority to prevent
the development and construction of nuclear plants, PUCs must inevitably
cope with the costs of such construction.
The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) exercises almost ab-
solute control over all phases of nuclear power plant operation, from site
selection to final decommissioning. Utilities must obtain a construction per-
mit from the NRC prior to building a nuclear power plant and an operating
license before the plant can be used. The Atomic Energy Act specifically pro-
vides that the NRC shall retain control over the construction and operation
of nuclear power production facilities.29 The NRC may also revoke any license
it has granted if the holder of such license has digressed from the standards
established in construction and operating permits, or has violated any other
regulation of the NRC.30 The NRC may even permit a nuclear facility to con-
tinue operating after its license has been revoked.
3'
Although utilities and state regulatory agencies may participate in the selec-
tion of sites for nuclear power plants, their influence is limited. The ultimate
decision as to reactor siting is controlled by the NRC under its reactor site
criteria.32 These criteria are based on factors relevant to the safe operation
of nuclear reactors, and include such factors as engineering characteristics
of the proposed plant in relation to its site, and meteorological conditions
at the site.
33
Thus, state regulation is confined to the generation, sale, or transmission
of electric power produced by nuclear plants while the NRC controls the cost
of construction, which is a major factor in rate-setting.
Dual control of nuclear facilities is an important influence on the ultimate
cost to consumers. The problem arises from the conflicting goals of each
regulatory authority. The NRC emphasizes safe operation, while state PUCs
emphasize the benefit/cost of power production. While the NRC's task is
28. 472 F. Supp. 191, 200 (S.D. Cal. 1974) (emphasis added).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1973).
30. Id. § 2236(a).
31. Id. § 2238. This statute allows the NRC to take possession of and operate any facility
whose license has been revoked, but only for such period of time as the public convenience
and necessity or the production program of the NRC requires it, or until a new license becomes
effective.
32. 10 C.F.R. § 100 (1981).
33. Id. § 100.10.
1983]
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technically complex, it has the single goal of safe operation. State PUCs must
resolve the conflicting goals of minimizing costs to ratepayers, ensuring an
adequate supply of electrical power, and allowing utilities to make a fair profit.
Construction Licensing Process
The NRC, with its safety orientation, requires a lengthy licensing process
designed to test every one of the proposed plant's safety features and en-
vironmental safeguards. The NRC requires that a utility obtain a construc-
tion permit before building a nuclear reactor, and an operating license before
obtaining fissionable fuels after the plant is completed. The procedure for
obtaining a permit to construct requires much more time and money because
it involves issues such as environmental impact, siting, and reactor design
features. From 1971 to 1975 a typical uncontested permit proceeding took
four months, and a contested proceeding took nine months.34 The evalua-
tions required for construction permits are becoming increasingly complex,
especially since Three Mile Island.
Prior to formal application for a construction permit, a utility normally
incurs great expense in studying, locating, and purchasing a site, acquiring
state and local permits, preparing cost estimates, and organizing a funding
program for the project. The utility then begins a series of informal discussions
with the NRC to determine if the application is complete.3 The completed
application includes a preliminary safety analysis report, 6 an environmental
report,3 and information regarding antitrust matters." If the application is
deemed complete, a formal tender is made to the "NRC. The tendered appli-
cation now requires six to eight years for processing the final approval.
The application is thoroughly reviewed by the NRC staff, whose evalua-
tions become a part of it. The staff evaluation alone may take months because
of inadequate staffing, schedule conflicts, and overbroad, outdated rules. 9
After incorporating the staff evaluation, the NRC publishes notices of the
application and makes it available for review by any interested parties."0 The
NRC staff then prepares a draft environmental impact statement and circulates
it for comment."' After the comments are received, the impact statement is
revised to incorporate them and a final impact statement is filed. 42
The adjudicatory process starts at this point. Intervention by third parties
is common, and hearings may continue for months. Afterward, the NRC's
34. NucIEAR PowER CosTs, supra note 5, at 43.
35. 10 C.F.R. § 2.101 (1981).
36. Id. § 50.34(a).
37. Id. § 50.30(0.
38. Id. § 50.33(a).
39. NRC Seeks Streamlined Licensing Process, PuB. Urn. FORT., Mar. 26, 1981, at 37.
40. 10 C.F.R. § 51.50(a) (1981).
41. Id. §§ 51.22-51.25. The draft is sent to the Environmental Protection Agency, federal
agencies having special jurisdiction regarding environmental standards, state agencies having jurisdic-
tion over environmental matters, and national and local environmental organization. The NRC
must also publish notice of hearings in the Federal Register and in local newspapers.
42. 10 C.F.R. § 51.26 (1981).
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three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issues its findings and ap-
proves or disapproves the application.43 The decision may be appealed within
the NRC to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board,4 and then to
the Commission en banc.
45
While this procedure may appear simple, the large number of intervenors
and the highly emotional issues involved usually assure an extended period
of hearings and appeals. The Seabrook Station plant in New Hampshire pro-
vides a recent example of the time period involved.41 In February 1972, PSCO
applied for a site certificate from the New Hampshire PUC. In March 1973,
PSCO applied to the NRC for a construction permit. The.NRC filed its final
environmental impact statement in December 1974, and formal hearings began
in April 1975; the hearings lasted into November 1975. Additional hearings
on safety-related issues were held in February and March 1976. In June 1976,
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued a construction permit.
Construction, however, was retarded by a series of 27 appeals, lasting from
May 1975 to September 1979. The permit was repeatedly stayed and reinstated
during this time, with the final reinstatement effective in July 1978-twenty-
five months after the original construction permit was issued.
Imprudent Investments
Congress apparently perceived a link between the financial capability of
a utility and the safe operation of a nuclear power plant when it passed the
Atomic Energy Act. The Act suggests that the Atomic Energy Commission
(now NRC) develop standards of financial ability for applicants. The Act,
however, imposes only the vague requirement that the applicant be equipped
to observe safety standards.4 The requirements imposed by the Code of Federal
Regulations address the need for liability insurance and indemnification.8
The Atomic Energy Act and the Code of Federal Regulations leave to the
state the problem of abandonment of nuclear facilities by utilities that suffer
financial crises. While this problem is properly delegated to state PUCs, Con-
gress has failed to recognize that the same financial crises may erode the utility's
ability to operate the plant safely.
The only financial data the NRC requires in an application is "information
sufficient to demonstrate to the Commission the financial qualification of the
applicant to carry out . . . the activities for which the permit or license is
sought."49 The applicant for a.construction permit must show that it possesses
funds necessary to cover estimated construction costs and related fuel cycle
costs or that it has a "reasonable assurance" of obtaining such funds, or
a combination of the two.50 The extraordinarily high capital cost of building
43. Id. § 2.721.
44. Id. § 2.785.
45. Id. § 2.786.
46. Sm mvR, supra note 16, apps. II, IV.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b)(2) (1973).
48. 10 C.F.R. § 140 (1981).
49. Id. § 50.33(0.
50. Id.
19831
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a nuclear power plant prevents most utilities from constructing on a cash basis,
so the term "reasonable assurance" is critical in assessing the financial
capability of the applicant. The NRC has refused to further define "reasonable
assurance"; however, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board has said
that "certainty need not be shown, and all contingencies need not be
foreseen."'5 t The NRC also refused to particularize financial requirements,
saying the complexities involved in estimating the costs of nuclear projects
prevent the applicant from providing more than a reasonable assurance that
it can provide funding.
52
A utility frequently finds that it is unable to fund a nuclear project accord-
ing to its original plan when participants withdraw or reduce their level of
investment. The utility then has several choices:
(1) it can apply for rate increases and the inclusion of CWIP in its current
rate base;
(2) it can issue new bonds or debentures to cover short-term borrowing
needed for current expenditures;
(3) it can suspend work until funding is assured; or
(4) it can abandon the project. Each of these will ultimately increase the
ratepayers' burden.
Inclusion of CWIP in the rate base forces consumers to pay now for ser-
vices to be rendered in the future. If new bonds are issued, ratepayers are
forced to pay higher rates in order to guarantee a reasonable rate of return
to the utility shareholders. If construction is delayed, the ratepayers will
ultimately pay the escalated costs of completion by one of the two preceding
methods. Finally, if the project is abandoned, ratepayers will pay, either
through amortization of the loss or increased rates, to guarantee a reasonable
return when the utility is forced to issue new stock or sell new bonds to finance
the loss.
Solutions
Reducing Construction Costs
One obvious way to protect ratepayers from excessive burdens is to stabilize
and reduce the costs of construction. Materials and labor are subject to the
market pressures that affect the costs of any type of construction and are
not susceptible to reduction by regulation. Costs can be reduced by the use
of generic reactors that have already been tested and approved by the NRC.
The use of generic plant designs would reduce costs even further.
The use of generic designs would also facilitate the development of realistic
cost estimates, which will allow utilities to devise adequate funding programs
51. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2), 7 N.R.C. 33,
79 (1977). The Appeals Board appeared to base its assessment of the applicant's financial capability
on the fact that the project had already been approved by the state PUC, which would presumably
allow rate increases sufficient to maintain the applicant's financial stability.
52. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station Units I and 2), 7 N.R.C. 1, 19
(1978).
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and prevent unexpected cost increases. The NRC, which has ready access to
almost all available information about nuclear reactor costs, should participate
in the development of firm criteria for estimating construction costs.
Reducing Licensing Costs
Another way to reduce costs is to shorten the time required for processing
construction permit applications. Delays in issuing permits cost ratepayers an
estimated $2.7 billion to $3.6 billion through 1982.51 The NRC has recognized
the high cost of delay, and is currently organizing a "recovery plan" to speed
up staff review of applications. A number of alternatives could help streamline
the licensing process. One is to delegate some of the functions now vested
in the NRC to state conservation and regulatory agencies. This suggestion
recognizes that local groups are ordinarily well-equipped to evaluate such items
as local ecology, aesthetic standards, energy needs, and the financial capability
of applicants. Its weakness lies in the fact that narrow geographical interests
may fail to consider regional and national needs for energy facilities."4
Some delays are caused by conflicts between the federal regulatory agencies
that participate, either as advisers or as intervenors, in the licensing process.
Some of these conflicts could be eliminated by using a licensing coordination
office. This office could establish time-tables, coordinate the efforts of
regulatory agencies, and generally ensure that applications are not caught in
an agency bottleneck." A coordinating office would be useful in acquiring
and evaluating data from state regulatory agencies, should states ever be
authorized to participate in the licensing process.
Reforms suggested by the NRC would alter its rules of procedure rather
than make fundamental changes in its function or structure. The proposed
changes could limit the decision-making time for most applications to eight
months. These changes include eliminating the right to discovery against the
NRC staff, allowing the licensing board to rule upon motions orally, and
allowing the applicant to file a reply to another party's submissions. The pro-
posed rules would also place a time limit on discovery. Because all of these
changes would reduce participation by third parties, the NRC would allow
intervenors to file motions at any time. 6
The House Appropriations Committee supplied additional inipetus for the
NRC reforms in its Supplemental Appropriations and Rescission Bill for fiscal
1981.1" The Committee approved three policy amendments designed to speed
up licensing. Under these directives, the NRC may not spend any of its funds
on license hearings that consider the need for power, site conflicts, the appli-
cant's financial qualifications, or alternative energy sources. Second, interven-
tion would be permitted only when the intervenor has "legally defensible"
53. NRC Seeks Streamlined Licensing Process, PUB. Umr. FORT., Mar. 26, 1981, at 37.
54. Doub, Federal Energy Regulation-Toward aBetter Way, 60 A.B.A.J. 920, 922 (1974).
55. Id. at 921.
56. NRC Backs Expedited Procedures for Nuclear Plants, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 9, 1981,
at 42.
57. H.R. 3400, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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proof of his claims. Finally, only parties directly affected by the construction
or operation of a specific nuclear power plant may intervene.8
Preventing Imprudent Investments
All of these proposed measures may operate to reduce the costs of nuclear
plant construction. They do nothing, however, to reduce the precertification
costs of construction. In capital-intensive projects like nuclear plants, huge
amounts of money can be spent in site preparation before the state PUC ac-
quires jurisdiction. Precertification costs can be so high as to nullify the state's
power to prevent wasteful investments at ratepayers' expense. The most ef-
fective safeguard against wasteful investments is the certificate of need re-
quired in many states to construct a generating plant. While this device has
the advantage of preventing expenditures for construction, it has an impor-
tant fault: a regulatory agency does not acquire jurisdiction over the proposed
construction project until an application for project certification is submit-
ted. Even if certification is denied, the ratepayers will ultimately absorb any
preconstruction expenditures.
Another device for controlling capital expenditures for construction is that
used in Oklahoma-state certification of security issues." Under Michigan
law, which also requires certification of utility security issues,'0 the PUC may
inquire into the prudence of the expenditures to be financed from the pro-
ceeds. Certification inquiries address the need for the project, loan forecasts,
and comparative economics of alternative types of power plants.
6'
This device, like the certificate of need, fails to protect the ratepayer from
expenses incurred prior to certification procedures. If it is used in conjunction
with the regulatory agency's procedural rules, however, the protection afforded
to the consumer is magnified. Before authorizing securities, the regulatory
agency should require a thorough analysis of the applicant's financial qualifica-
tions, including such questions as: What percentage of the capital f6r con-
struction will come from the sale of the proposed securities? Does the appli-
cant plan to include CWIP in its rate base? Has the applicant been experienc-
ing any financial difficulties? If so, is it a problem common to the industry
as a whole, or is it peculiar to the applicant?2 Additional rules should establish
a firm policy limiting the amount of CWIP which may be included in the
rate base and limiting the rate increases attributable to construction.
Wisconsin has adopted a more drastic solution that appears to be a workable
compromise between illusory and total control of utility expenditures.63 Wiscon-
58. Nuclear Issues Claim Congressional Attention, PUB. UTnL. FORT., May 21, 1981, at 38.
59. See 17 OKu.A. STAT. § 184 (1981), which provides that public utilities may not issue securities
for "the acquisition of property, the construction, extension of improveinent of its facilities,
or the improvement of its service.. ." unless authorized to do so by the Corporation Commission.
60. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 406.301 (1980 Supp.).
61. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 TULSA L.J. 262, 286 (1979).
62. STEVER, supra note 16, at 130.
63. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 TULSA L.J. 262, 286 (1979).
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sin's statutes require that utilities submit an advanced planning program every
other year. The program must include a description of all facilities the utility
owns or plans to construct within the next ten years; it must also include
descriptions of alternatives and justify their rejection." The advance programs
are then supplied to local governments and to all of the state agencies that
will regulate the proposed construction." Each agency must then indicate what
procedures will be necessary to obtain that agency's approval.6 The Wiscon-
sin PUC will approve the plan only when it will provide an adequate supply
of electricity; it is in the public interest; it provides incentives to conserve
electricity; and it is coordinated with long-range plans to policies of other
agencies.7 A certificate of public convenience and necessity permitting plant
construction may be approved only when the proposed facility is in substantial
compliance with the utility's most recent advance plan.
68
While the Wisconsin plan adds a substantial burden to the state's PUC,
it prevents large expenditures for preconstruction costs and prevents the
development of construction plants that are inappropriate to the service or
inconsistent with the policies and goals of the regulatory agency.
Conclusion
The extraordinary capital investments and losses involved in the construc-
tion of nuclear power plants ultimately burden the utility's ratepayers. Such
costs may be passed directly by the inclusion of current construction costs
or amortization of losses in current rates. They may also be passed indirectly
to supply the fair rate of return guaranteed to state-franchised utility
shareholders.
The ratepayers' burden is increased by cost overruns attributable to inac-
curate cost estimates, frequent design changes to meet statutory requirements,
and lengthy licensing procedures. The burden is additionally increased when
a utility terminates a nuclear project because the ratepayers receive no benefit
from such expenditures.
State regulatory agencies have no authority to control the construction and
the attendant costs of nuclear generating plants; such power is vested exclusively
in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC, however, has no authority
to set rates for electricity generated from nuclear plants; such power is vested
exclusively in the states. This dual control contributes greatly to the ratepayers'
burden in states that use traditional methods to control utilities' expansion
because such methods are available only after the state acquires jurisdiction
via rate-setting and project certification. The huge capital outlays made before
the actual construction begins and before application for rate increases or
certification are made can nullify the state's power to protect ratepayers from
64. Vis. STAT. § 196.491(2)(a) (1981).
65. Id. § 196.491(2)(b).
66. Id. § 196.491(2)(c).
67. Id. § 196.491(2)(i).
68. Id. § 196.491(3)(d)(i).
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